Estimation of structural optimization models: a note on identification by Srisuma, Sorawoot
 
 
 
 
 
Estimation of Structural Optimization 
Models: A Note on Identification∗ 
 
 
Sorawoot Srisuma† 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    The Suntory Centre 
Suntory and Toyota International Centres for 
Economics and Related Disciplines 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Discussion paper no.:  Houghton Street 
EM/2010/547   London WC2A 2AE 
May 2010    Tel:  020 7955 6674 
 
                                                 
∗ I thank Jim Heckman, Oliver Linton, Bob Miller, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler and Elie Tamer for 
comments and suggestions. I also thank Lanier Benkard for a helpful discussion. This research is 
partially supported by the ESRC. 
† Department of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, 
United Kingdom.  E-mail address: s.t.srisuma@lse.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) propose an estimation methodology for a broad 
class of dynamic optimization problems. To carry out their procedure, one needs to 
select a set of alternative policy functions and compare the implied expected 
payoffs with that from the data.  We show that this can generally lead to objective 
functions that are not capable of consistently estimating an identified model. 
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Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), henceforth BBL, propose a methodology to estimate a broad
class of structural dynamic models. The motivation behind the construction of their estimator is
conceptually appealing as it relies directly on necessary conditions of an economic equilibrium. They
also propose a set estimator to estimate partially identied models.
The idea behind BBLs estimator relies on the notion of an economic equilibrium so that the
optimal policy will lead to higher values in expectation than those based on alternative policies. In
practice, only a strict subclass of alternative policies can be considered. This may lead to the loss
of identication since we do not make use of all the relevant constraints implied by the equilibrium
behavior.1
We use a simple optimization example, which belongs to the class of models considered in BBL,
to show that the moment inequality approach of BBL can lead to criterion functions that are not
capable of consistently estimate an identied model. In what follows we use the same notation in
BBL wherever possible.
Example: Leaving out the observable state variables, we specify the payo¤ function to be
 (a; ; ) =  a2 + 2a;
where a and  take values from the support of the control and state variables, A and V, respectively.2
We assume the researcher observes a sequence of fatgTt=1, which is the maximizer of the payo¤function
above when  = 0, whilst ftgTt=1 are not observed. We are interested in estimating 0. Let G be
any known distribution for t with zero mean. It is easy to see that the optimal policy function
 (; ) satises
 (; ) =  for all  2 ;  2 V :
Let  be any subset of R+, this ensures that the policy function will be increasing in the state
variable, satisfying the monotone choice assumption which is essential to BBLs simulation method.
Notice that if  6= 0 then  (t; ) 6=  (t; 0) a:s:, therefore this parametric model is identied since
any  2  implies a unique corresponding policy function  (; ). Then given the data, along with
some standard regularity conditions, one can construct a consistent estimator for 0 by maximum
likelihood or other minimum distance methods.
BBL Methodology: Let x 2 X denote a particular inequality, see BBL (p. 1347). In a single
agent problem without other state variables, x simply corresponds to an alternative policy 0 2 ,
1Since BBL assumes the model is dened through a set of conditional moment restrictions, identication here
means that there is a unique parameter value in the parameter space that satises all the moment restrictions; hence
the loss of identication here refers to the situation when an implied submodel loses this uniqueness property.
2Including the observable state variables, st, will not change our general conclusion even if we allow st and t to
be correlated.
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where  is a set of functions mapping V to A. For any  2 , the di¤erence in the implied expected
payo¤s from using the true policy relative to an alternative policy 0 is dened by
g (x; ) = E [ ( (t; 0) ; t; )]  E [ (0 (t) ; t; )] :
The set of optimality conditions from the equilibrium, represented by inequalities, leads to the
following type of criterion functions
Q () =
Z
X
(min fg (x; ) ; 0g)2 dH (x) ;
where H is some distribution on X . By denition of an optimal policy, Q (0) must be zero since
 ( (t; 0) ; t; 0)   (0 (t) ; t; 0)  0 a:s:;
for any function 0 2 , and this must also hold in expectation, i.e. g (x; 0)  0 for all x 2 X .3
BBLs minimum distance estimator is dened to minimize the sample analogue of Q (). However, it
is generally infeasible to construct the empirical counterpart of Q () to incoperate all the inequality
constraints implied by the equilibrium behavior. Since this set is uncountably large, ad hoc exclusions
of alternative policies are required for implementation. In what follows, we explicitly use the subscript
E on (X ; H) to denote the subset of all alternative policies and its corresponding underlying measure.
Additive Perturbation (I): Additive perturbation is rst suggested in BBL, and it is the most
widely used method to construct alternative policies in practice.4 In fact, we present two versions
of such sets of inequalities. Intuitively, one simply perturbs the true policy by an additive random
shock and compare the implied expected payo¤s with that from the true. More formally, for some
user-chosen distribution , typically N (0; 1), dene
XE1 = f0 () : 0 () =  (; 0) +  for  2 Support ()  Rg :
The measure HE1 denotes the measure that generates the random variable  from , independent of
t, for convenience we denote this by F. Therefore we can construct a criterion function indexed
by (XE1 ; HE1)
QE1 () =
Z
XE1
(min fg (x; ) ; 0g)2 dHE1 (x) ;
3If the parametric model is identied, it is easy to provide primitive conditions on  (at; t; ) and G (dt) to ensure
the implied conditional moment inequality restriction is uniquely satisfy only at  = 0. As satised by our example,
it will be su¢ cient if (i)  (a; ; ) is concave on a convex set A and has a unique maximizer in the interior of A for
all (; ); (ii)  (a; ; ) is once continuously di¤erentiable on A for all (; ); (iii) The distribution of t has nite rst
moment.
4The dynamic version of this class of alternatives is informally described in BBL (p. 1348). It is easy to nd papers
which randomly perturbed their policies in this way, for example see the Monte Carlo experiments in BBL, and the
empirical studies in Norton (2009), Ryan (2009), Santos (2009).
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The empirical analogue ofQE1 () can be constructed in practice by simulation, as outlined in BBL, by
taking random samples drawn from HE1. Then one can construct an estimator based on minimizing
QE1 (). In our example, it is easy to check that the di¤erence between payo¤s obtained from the
true and an alternative policy in XE1 is
 ( (t; 0) ; t; )   ( (t; 0) + ; t; ) = 2 + 2t (0   ) : (1)
To obtain g (x; ) we integrate out t. Since t has zero mean, we have
QE1 () =
Z  
min

2; 0
	2
dF () :
Clearly, QE1 () = 0 for all  2  and any distribution  that is not degenerate at zero (which would
then not represent alternative policies). That is, in this example, this class of alternative policies has
no identifying power for 0.
The additive perturbation method is motivated by the fact that we decompose the true policy
function into the sum of an alternative policy 0 and a residual function,  (), dened on V so that
 (t; 0) = 
0 (t) +  (t) a:s:
Note that the criterion function constructed from XE1 ignores the dependence on t.5 So XE1 is
exactly the set of functions that are translation shifts from the true policy. However, it remains
unclear how to construct a subset of X to depend on t appropriately. We now describe the other
method of additive perturbation, which is often seen as an adequate improvement on XE1 to ensure
consistency, that has been implemented in practice. It is motivated by the following condition
span f () +  :  2 Rg = R for all  2 V :
Additive Perturbation (II): An alternative policy in this class can be constructed from adding
a continuum of i.i.d. shocks indexed by  2 V, with some distribution  that is independent of t,
to the true policy function pointwise on V.6 To compare the di¤erence between payo¤s, rst note
that the analogous expression to (1) in this case is
 ( (t; 0) ; t; )   ( (t; 0) + t; t; ) = 2t + 2tt (0   ) ;
5Some readers might have been misled by the notation in BBL (p. 1348), and consider this type of perturbation,
since  is not explicitly written to depend on the state variables.
6More formally,
XE2 = f0 () : 0 () =  (; 0) +  () for  2 E (V;)g ;
where E (V;) is a set of functions mapping V to Support (). Here HE2 is the underlying measure that denes
a stochastic process (R ())2V , which is independent of t, such that R () is independent of R0 () whenever
 6= 0, and R () has distribution  for all  2 V.
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where t has distribution  and is independent of t. In expectation, which is often obtained by
simulation, for a generic x 2 XE2 we have
g (x; ) = E

2t

+ 2E [tt] (0   ) :
Assume that the second moment of t exist. Since t and t are independent and t has zero mean,
once again we have g (x; )  0 for all  2 . So this class of alternative policies cannot be used to
consistently estimate 0; notice that g (x; ) takes the same value, E2t , for every x in XE2 .
Multiplicative Scale: We consider another natural class of policies, based on a multiplicative
scale of the true policy, which has also been used in practice.7 Formally, for some user-chosen
distribution , dene
XE3 = f0 () : 0 () =  (; 0) for  2 Support ()g :
The measureHE3 then denotes the measure that generates the random variable  from, independent
of t. To be more specic, suppose that  is the uniform distribution on a unit interval, the non-
negative support is chosen to ensure that the alternative policies are also monotone on V. For each
 2 , the di¤erence between payo¤s from the true and an alternative x in XE3 are
 ( (t; 0) ; t; )   ( (t; 0) ; t; ) =  0 (1  ) ((1 + ) 0   2) 2t ;
g (x; ) =  0 (1  ) ((1 + ) 0   2)E

2t

:
Assuming E [2t ] <1, from examining g (x; ) we see that if   0, then it follows that g (x; )  0.
So any  2 [0;1) will imply that QE2 () = 0. On the other hand it is easy to show that any
 2 (0; 0) will imply QE2 () > 0. The criterion function based on this class of alternative policies
can at best consistently estimate the set n (0; 0). We now show that the class of multiplicative
scale can lead to criterion functions that has a unique minimizer at 0 when  has larger support.
Without any exclusions, X is the set of measurable functions  2 . For a generic x 2 X , it
follows from simple algebra that
g (x; ) =   (   0)2 E

2t

+ E

(t    (t))2

for any  2 .
In this case, the class of alternative policies which is a multiplicative scale from the truth can ensures
that we can construct criterion functions with a unique minimizer at 0 so long as the support of 
is su¢ ciently large. To see this, note that we require g (x; ) < 0 to hold with positive measure (on
some XE) whenever  6= 0; this inequality is equivalent to
E

(t    (t))2

< E

2t

(   0)2 :
7Jeziorski (2009) applies uniformly distributed multiplicative shocks to his choice probabilities in implementing
BBLs methodology.
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For any  = 0 + , note that, by letting  (t) = (   ) t, the inequality above holds whenever
jj < jj. This means that when  is a compact subset of R+ containing 0, setting XE = XE3 and
letting HE be any continuous distribution with full support on the positive half-line will be su¢ cient
to ensure that QE () has a well separated minimum at 0.
Conclusion: We show that applications of the moment inequality approach of BBL can lead to
objective functions that cannot be used to consistently estimate an identied model. The practical
implication is potentially serious as there is generally no economic prior nor statistical theory to
help us select the set of inequalities to ensure that the corresponding objective function has a unique
minimum in the limit. Since most applications of BBL use their point estimation method, in nite
sample, various optimization routines will produce point estimates that may not be informative at all.
Although we have not explicitly shown analogous identication problems in a set identied model,
we also expect such examples to exist.
The intuition behind our ndings is related to the identication issue studied in Domínguez and
Lobato (2004). They show one can lose identication in an identied conditional moment restriction
model by only relying on a nite number of unconditional moment conditions. They also show
how to obtain an informationally equivalent unconditional model, that can be used for consistent
estimation, from conditional moment equality restrictions. Khan and Tamer (2009) applies a similar
idea to preserve the informational content under the moment inequality framework. However, the
inequality restrictions considered in BBL is complicated by the fact that their conditional model is
indexed by the set of alternative policy functions.8 As our example shows, even if we begin with
an identied unconditional model, we can lose identication by only considering a subset of all
alternative policies. The issue of how we can generally preserve the information implied by the set
of alternative policies remains an open problem.
However, it is clear that this identication problem can be alleviated by integrating over larger
classes of policies. It is important to note that considering more alternative policies in the same class
may not be informative. It is more crucial to consider broader classes of policies. We show that,
even when the class of alternative policy functions spans A pointwise on V, it does not necessarily
grow dense in the set of all alternative policies. We illustrate this point with the most widely used
method to construct alternatives, by adding random noise to the policy, where we exploit the fact
that these alternatives do not use any information on the state variable. The intuition behind this is
that the spanning property only implies we cover the same range as the set of all alternative policies.
However, this is not su¢ cient, as the set of alternative policies are not determined by their range,
but by how the state variable is transformed into an action. Randomly perturbing the true policy at
8Unlike Rn, a set of functions has no obvious ordering property so we cannot simply extend the techniques used in
Domínguez and Lobato (2004) and Khan and Tamer (2009).
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each state does not allow the perturbation shock to depend stochastically on the state, it merely uses
V as an index set. So it is not surprising that the set of randomly perturbed alternatives is not dense
in the set of all alternatives. Therefore, the perturbations which are correlated to the states will
contain valuable information for identifying the parameter of interest and these should be exploited
in practice.
Lastly, we comment that most applications of BBL methodology focus on alternative policies
which do not depend on the model. In the other extreme, one can construct inequalities from model
implied policies. The advantage of using the model is that we can write down an interpretable
identication condition, if this holds then we can consistently estimate the true parameter of interest
under some standard regularity conditions. However, implementing this in the forward simulation
framework may likely limit the computational advantages described in BBL.
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